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REENVISIONING LAW THROUGH THE
DNA LENS
EDWARD K CHENG*
In recent times, no development has transformed the practice
of criminal justice as much as DNA evidence. In little over fifteen
years, DNA profiling has produced nothing short of a paradigm
shift.1 For police and prosecutors, DNA has become a potent
weapon for identifying and convicting criminals. Trace biological
material left at a crime scene now provides critical evidence for gen-
erating leads through "cold searches" of DNA databases and for
convicting defendants at trial. At the same time, for defense attor-
neys, DNA has become an invaluable tool for seeking exonerations,
because just as DNA can link defendants to crimes, it can exclude
suspects and the wrongly convicted.
DNA is a special kind of evidence with few previous analogs: It
is powerful, physical evidence of identity that remains stable and
available for retesting long after trial. Its "code," consisting of only
four chemically distinct base-pairs, can be objectively sequenced
(often by machine), eliminating much of the discretion and subjec-
tivity that plagues traditional forensic methods. Finally, because the
scientific community developed DNA typing, DNA evidence comes
pre-packaged with all the indicia of scientific reliability: population
statistics, pre-defined and pre-tested procedural standards, and
known error rates.
The most important revolution wrought by DNA, however,
comes not from the direct, case-by-case application of the technol-
ogy, but from the broader shifts in perspective that it has engen-
dered. DNA's unique attributes have provided a new lens through
which we can critique, rethink, and perhaps reform various aspects
of our legal system.
The panel discussion that I had the privilege of introducing at
the Powers and Pitfalls of Technology Symposium, held on Febru-
ary 6, 2004, is a testament to DNA's pervasive influence. Each of
* Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Many thanks to Margaret
Berger, Peter Gutherie, and the editors of the NYUAnnual Survey of American Law.
Melissa Ballard provided excellent research assistance.
1. The first appellate case challenging the admissibility of DNA occurred in
1988. See State v. Andrews, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Jennifer L.
Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13, 44 &
n.90 (2001).
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the panel participants provided examples of how DNA has empow-
ered legal actors to challenge well-established assumptions and
practices. Can we reform the criminal justice system to ensure
greater accuracy and prevent future wrongful convictions? Should
we relax doctrines such as repose and finality to accomplish this
accuracy? How valid are the reigning forensic techniques and how
do we assess their validity? The DNA lens brings all of these issues
into sharp focus.
Post-conviction DNA testing imposes pressure on our long-
standing notions of finality. As a historical matter, a strict finality
doctrine made practical sense. 2 Most traditional forms of evidence
are fleeting-memories fade, eyewitnesses move away, and (writ-
ten) records are unwieldy to preserve and frequently lost. At the
same time, new evidence is rarely dispositive. 3 For example, even if
a principal witness recants, the damage to the underlying case is
rarely fatal. Other, conflicting evidence likely remains, and one
could easily suspect the recanting witness of lying. As a result, the
benefit of reopening judgments is simply not worth its costs. Any
marginal benefit derived from considering new evidence is almost
certainly outweighed by the difficulties associated with retrying a
stale case.
When the new evidence is DNA, however, the calculus
changes. DNA does not degrade or become less reliable. 4 DNA
also has few credibility issues, assuming compliance with proper
procedures. And perhaps most importantly, in certain cases, DNA
can dispositively exonerate a defendant.5 The availability of DNA
2. Jeter v. Hewitt, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 352, 364 (1859) (describing resjudicata as
rendering "white that which is black, and straight that which is crooked").
3. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REv. 125, 131-32 (2004) (noting that "non-DNA
cases are much harder for defendants to overturn through post-conviction pro-
ceedings because of the absence of a method to prove innocence to a scientific
certainty").
4. Naturally, the DNA material left at a crime scene can degrade over time,
but assuming that the material can be tested, the results will be reliable. Degraded
DNA is either testable or not; it does not degrade in accuracy.
5. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVI-
DENCE, PosTcoNvIcrION DNA TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING RE_
QUESTS 4-6 (1999) (defining five categories of DNA testing cases, ranging from
instances in which testing can dispositively exonerate to instances in which testing
is largely irrelevant or impossible), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/
177626.pdf.
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testing thus challenges the. wisdom of having a strong finality
doctrine. 6
Professor Seth Kreimer's article, which expands upon his com-
ments during the symposium panel discussion, explores the tension
between finality and accuracy in the criminal justice system that is
created by the rise of DNA. In the early days of DNA testing, prose-
cutors were extremely reluctant to reopen cases, citing "the impor-
tance of 'finality' in criminal justice." 7 Since then, legislative
reforms 8 and commentary9 have encouraged the relaxation of final-
ity, and post-conviction testing has become more common.
The pressure imposed by this newly resurrected focus on accu-
racy, however, extends beyond post-conviction testing requests by
defendants. Other finality-based doctrines, including ones that
limit prosecutors, are also called into question. 10 As Professor
Kreimer also notes, some foreign jurisdictions, most notably En-
gland, have begun encroaching on double jeopardy when DNA is
involved, championing accuracy over finality.11
Professor Barry Scheck's comments during the panel discus-
sion continued the assault on finality, suggesting that the ability to
reopen convictions should not be limited to DNA cases, but ex-
panded to encompass all instances that involve persuasive forms of
proof.1 2 His discussion also demonstrated DNA's influence on the
current reconsideration of statutes of limitation. 13 Statutes of limi-
tation historically provided defendants both repose and protection
6. See Seth F. Kreimer, Truth Machines and Consequences: The Dark Side of "Accu-
racy" in Criminal Justice, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 657 (2005) ("It would stretch
legal fiction beyond the breaking point to characterize a prisoner as scientifically
innocent, but guilty in the eyes of the law.").
7. Kreimer, supra note 6, at 655.
8. E.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1-a) (McKinney 2004) (providing de-
fendants with access to post-conviction DNA testing); see also Rochelle L. Haller,
The Innocence Protection Act: Why Federal Measures Requiring Post-Conviction DNA Test-
ing and Preservation of Evidence Are Needed in Order to Reduce the Risk of Wrongful Execu-
tions, 18 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HuM. RTs. 101, 123-26 (2001) (describing a few early state
statutes permitting post-conviction DNA testing).
9. E.g., Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Factual
Innocence and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 547, 554 (2002) (argu-
ing for a constitutional right to post-conviction DNA testing).
10. See generally Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Move-
ment, 96 HARv. L. REV. 561, 587 (1983) (describing the use of the counter-
principles in a body of law to explore alternative institutions).
11. Kreimer, supra note 6, at 670-72.
12. Barry Scheck, Remarks at the Power and Pitfalls of Technology Confer-
ence (Feb. 6, 2004) (transcript on file with the NYU Annual Survey of American
Law).
13. Id.
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against prosecutions based on stale evidence. DNA, however, has
provoked doubts about the balance struck. Some prosecutors have
begun seeking John Doe warrants based on a specific DNA profile,
hoping to circumvent limitation periods. 14 Others have advocated
for an abolition of statutes of limitation in cases involving biological
evidence. 15 Once again, DNA has reinvigorated debate and forced
us to confront assumptions and traditions that heretofore have ap-
peared cast in stone.
Both professors' remarks also touched on a broader critique of
the criminal justice system. Through DNA profiling, Innocence
Projects across the country have disturbingly revealed that errors
occur far more frequently than one could have ever thought. The
recent spate of exonerations dramatically illustrates that traditional
forms of evidence-and indeed the criminal justice process itself-
can be highly unreliable. For years, social scientists have admon-
ished courts about the potential problems associated with eyewit-
ness testimony16 and confessions,1 7 and legal commentators have
deplored the disparities between prosecutorial and defense re-
sources. Yet, without some well-accepted external measure of accu-
racy, no one really knew whether those theoretical problems
ultimately caused any practical harm. DNA exonerations have now
made those concerns nearly impossible to ignore.
Finally, Robert Epstein's comments demonstrated how DNA's
influence extends beyond substantive identification issues and into
14. E.g., William K. Rashbaum, New York Pursues Old Cases of Rape Based Just on
DNA, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2003, at Al (describing the NYC John Doe Indictment
Project and $350,000 in federal grants used to fund the program).
15. E.g., Cindi Lash, Prosecutors Want More Time to Try Rape Cases, PiTTSBURGH
POsT-GAzETTE, Nov. 18, 2001, at Al (reporting efforts by Pennsylvania legislators to
extend or abolish limitation periods for certain crimes when DNA is available);
Paul H. Robinson, Justice Can Never Come Too Late, WASH. POST, May 3, 2000, at A23
(arguing that new forensic tools like DNA make statutes of limitation unnecessary
and that statutes of limitation should be abolished for serious felonies).
16. E.g., United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 71-72 (D. Mass. 1999)
(allowing testimony of expert psychologist who testified to cognitive issues that
reduce the reliability of eyewitnesses).
17. E.g., United States v. Hall, 974 F. Supp. 1198, 1205 (C.D. Ill. 1997)
("[T] he science of social psychology, and specifically the field involving the use of
coercion in interrogations, is sufficiently developed in its methods to constitute a
reliable body of specialized knowledge under Rule 702."). See generally PETER
BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS 144-93 (2000) (discussing the place of confes-
sions in American culture); Richard J. Ofshe & Rcihard A. Leo, The Decision to
Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENv. U. L. REv. 979 (provid-
ing a broad overview on the reasons why defendants falsely convict).
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the actual methods of forensic scientists. 18 DNA shows us what
good science really looks like. Indeed, it establishes so powerful a
model that it arguably drove the Supreme Court reasoning in
Daubert,1 9 and led Mr. Epstein to file what he admits "some might
consider to be the most unsuccessful motion ever filed in the his-
tory of criminal law"2 0-a motion challenging the reliability and ad-
missibility of fingerprints.
As DNA demonstrates, good science knows its own limitations
and constantly tests its own validity. Scientific techniques have
preset standards; technicians undergo periodic proficiency testing;
and researchers publish new techniques so that they can be corrob-
orated or discredited by others. DNA profiling has all of these char-
acteristics and is even accompanied by population statistics that aid
jurors (and researchers) in assessing just how probative a "match"
really is.
Fingerprinting-or any other traditional forensic science, for
that matter-has few if any of these characteristics. Instead, as Mr.
Epstein related, fingerprint examiners have no defined standards,
minimal proficiency testing, and perhaps most alarmingly, no estab-
lished error rates. 21 Fingerprint examiners refuse (and indeed are
forbidden by professional norms) to discuss probabilities and popu-
lation statistics, instead hiding behind rather dubious assertions of
absolute certainty.22 So exposed, fingerprints can no longer be the
"gold standard" of forensic science. That title now belongs to DNA.
The DNA lens forces us to confront fingerprinting and to ask
what should be done with it. Perhaps fingerprints should be inad-
missible, or alternatively, defense attorneys should be given the re-
sources and training necessary to expose fingerprinting's
weaknesses to juries. We can of course debate the solutions, but in
18. Robert Epstein, Remarks at the Power and Pitfalls of Technology Confer-
ence (Feb. 6, 2004) (transcript on file with the NYU Annual Survey of American
Law).
19. Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings: Questions
Daubert Does Not Answer, 33 SETON HALL L. Rv. 1125, 1129 (2003) (noting that
DNA "may have paved the way for the Supreme Court's opinion in Daubert" and
observing that the Daubert criteria were instrumental in placing "DNA profiling on
such firm ground"); David L, Faigman, The Tipping Point in the Law's Use of Science:
The Epidemic of Scientific Sophistication That Began with DNA Profiling and Toxic Torts,
67 BROOK. L. REv. 111, 112 (2001) (suggesting that DNA played a significant role
in encouraging the Supreme Court to reach the Daubert decision).
20. Epstein, supra note 18.
21. Id.
22. Simon A. Cole, Fingerprinting: The First Junk Science?, 28 OKLA. Crrv U. L.
REv. 73, 87-88 (2003).
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the end, I have little doubt that fingerprinting will become a more
rigorous "science," and DNA will deserve much of the credit.
Truly special developments in law cause us to rethink the
broader underpinnings of our legal system, and DNA certainly has
been and will continue to be a part of this select group. Indeed,
one cannot even begin to understand the future of evidence law
without considering DNA's potential ramifications. Its substantive
powers of identification have already caused legal actors to question
firmly rooted traditions such as finality and repose, and generated
concerns about the accuracy and fairness of the criminal justice sys-
tem. At the same time, its methodological rigor has formed the
impetus for rethinking how courts handle scientific evidence, forc-
ing scientifically disinclined judges and lawyers alike to grapple with
the thorny relationship between law and science.
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